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Historical reading · v2 · 2026-06-25. Read the current understanding and full revision history →

Historical reading v2 · 公开专题 · 中美关系与中国外交

U.S.–China & China's Diplomacy

The U.S.–China relationship and its friction points (tech, trade, Taiwan), set against Beijing's broader great-power and Global South diplomacy — summits, MFA statements, partnerships, and how China frames its global posture.

Updated
2026-06-25
Revision
v2
Evidence
13 cited documents
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Historical reading v2 · v2 · 25 Jun

US-China tech friction persists; Beijing courts Global South without direct contact

The U.S.–China relationship remains in a sustained phase of economic friction without direct high-level diplomatic contact in this period. On June 22, MOFCOM added 10 U.S. entities—including Aveox, Red Cat Holdings, and Teal Drones—to its export control list 1. The blocking ban issued on May 2 under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (covering five Chinese petrochemical firms) remains in effect, signaling China's willingness to escalate retaliation 2. These moves demonstrate Beijing's determination to counter U.S. sanctions and export controls as a matter of principle.

With no bilateral summits or calls, Beijing's posture is read through its extensive Global South and multilateral diplomacy. PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng held a flurry of meetings with central bank heads from Argentina, Georgia, Mongolia, and others on June 9-10, and with Banque de France Governor on May 25, reinforcing bilateral financial ties 3, 4. Vice Finance Minister Liao Min co-chaired the 12th China-Brazil Finance Subcommittee in Beijing on June 9, emphasizing sustainable agriculture and green transition 5. At the New Development Bank's annual meeting in Moscow (May 14-15), China called for the bank to become a "reliable development partner" for the Global South, positioning it as a counterweight to Western-led institutions 6. CIPS chairman Wang Hongbo met with central bank officials from Bangladesh and Indonesia in June, promoting the cross-border payment system 7, 8.

Meanwhile, China is deploying narrative tools to contrast its openness with U.S. protectionism. At the Summer Davos Forum on June 24, Premier Li Keqiang touted "China Opportunity 2.0," stressing that Chinese innovation is an enabler, not a threat 9. Spokesperson Guo Jiakun repeatedly highlighted U.S. firms topping foreign exhibitor lists at chain expos 10. The Taiwan Affairs Office argued that unification would give Taiwan "greater dignity" and "more international space," implicitly positioning Beijing as a more reliable protector than Washington 11. China also deepened African ties: Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu attended Cameroon's national day, and reiterated zero-tariff treatment for 53 African nations and aid during Ebola 12. On Taiwan, China scored a diplomatic win when Honduras denied any "re-diplomatic" talks with Taipei 13.

What changed in this reading

The prior brief incorrectly dated the blocking ban as 'two days earlier' from June 22; new documents confirm it was issued May 2 2. Added PBOC meeting with France 4 and CIPS meetings 7, 8, deepening the financial infrastructure push. New MFA statements on Taiwan/Honduras 13 and Cameroon 12 strengthen the Global South narrative. No change in the absence of US direct contact.

An evidence comparison becomes available when two publishable readings are retained.

Evidence behind this reading

13 cited
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China Snapshot, a publication of CHINA SNAPSHOT LIMITED (Hong Kong). Operated by Tristan McInnis, Managing Partner, Inner Chapter, Shanghai. Chinese sources machine-translated by DeepSeek; interpretation drafted by a language model under our editorial standards; corrections to support@china-snapshot.com.