# U.S.–China & China's Diplomacy: US-China tech friction persists; Beijing courts Global South without direct contact

China Snapshot · created by Tristan McInnis · reading v2
Updated: 2026-06-25T11:28:45.524678+00:00
Permanent reading: https://china-snapshot.com/analysis/dossiers/us-china-diplomacy/v2.html
AI-assisted interpretation; verify against the cited original sources.

## Current understanding at this revision

The U.S.–China relationship remains in a sustained phase of economic friction without direct high-level diplomatic contact in this period. On June 22, MOFCOM added 10 U.S. entities—including Aveox, Red Cat Holdings, and Teal Drones—to its export control list [1](https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zc/art/2026/art_600b218f9c6e4326a9a33500eda5d7fb.html). The blocking ban issued on May 2 under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (covering five Chinese petrochemical firms) remains in effect, signaling China's willingness to escalate retaliation [2](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/art/2026/art_78dd015b3fb94aa0b25d5ac98994aa4f.html). These moves demonstrate Beijing's determination to counter U.S. sanctions and export controls as a matter of principle.

With no bilateral summits or calls, Beijing's posture is read through its extensive Global South and multilateral diplomacy. PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng held a flurry of meetings with central bank heads from Argentina, Georgia, Mongolia, and others on June 9-10, and with Banque de France Governor on May 25, reinforcing bilateral financial ties [3](http://www.pbc.gov.cn/hanglingdao/128697/128734/128874/2026061022502150686/index.html), [4](http://www.pbc.gov.cn/hanglingdao/128697/128734/128874/2026052521380718669/index.html). Vice Finance Minister Liao Min co-chaired the 12th China-Brazil Finance Subcommittee in Beijing on June 9, emphasizing sustainable agriculture and green transition [5](http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/tupianxinwen1/202606/t20260609_3991372.htm). At the New Development Bank's annual meeting in Moscow (May 14-15), China called for the bank to become a "reliable development partner" for the Global South, positioning it as a counterweight to Western-led institutions [6](http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/tupianxinwen1/202605/t20260515_3989950.htm). CIPS chairman Wang Hongbo met with central bank officials from Bangladesh and Indonesia in June, promoting the cross-border payment system [7](https://www.cips.com.cn/cips/2026-06/10/article_2026061018243226117.html), [8](https://www.cips.com.cn/cips/2026-06/17/article_2026061709181072670.html).

Meanwhile, China is deploying narrative tools to contrast its openness with U.S. protectionism. At the Summer Davos Forum on June 24, Premier Li Keqiang touted "China Opportunity 2.0," stressing that Chinese innovation is an enabler, not a threat [9](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202606/t20260624_11951514.shtml). Spokesperson Guo Jiakun repeatedly highlighted U.S. firms topping foreign exhibitor lists at chain expos [10](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202606/t20260623_11950728.shtml). The Taiwan Affairs Office argued that unification would give Taiwan "greater dignity" and "more international space," implicitly positioning Beijing as a more reliable protector than Washington [11](https://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202606/t20260624_12772496.htm). China also deepened African ties: Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu attended Cameroon's national day, and reiterated zero-tariff treatment for 53 African nations and aid during Ebola [12](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbxw_new/202606/t20260623_11950257.shtml). On Taiwan, China scored a diplomatic win when Honduras denied any "re-diplomatic" talks with Taipei [13](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202606/t20260625_11952304.shtml).

## What changed in this reading

The prior brief incorrectly dated the blocking ban as 'two days earlier' from June 22; new documents confirm it was issued May 2 [2](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/art/2026/art_78dd015b3fb94aa0b25d5ac98994aa4f.html). Added PBOC meeting with France [4](http://www.pbc.gov.cn/hanglingdao/128697/128734/128874/2026052521380718669/index.html) and CIPS meetings [7](https://www.cips.com.cn/cips/2026-06/10/article_2026061018243226117.html), [8](https://www.cips.com.cn/cips/2026-06/17/article_2026061709181072670.html), deepening the financial infrastructure push. New MFA statements on Taiwan/Honduras [13](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202606/t20260625_11952304.shtml) and Cameroon [12](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbxw_new/202606/t20260623_11950257.shtml) strengthen the Global South narrative. No change in the absence of US direct contact.

## Open questions

- Will the U.S. retaliate against China's new export controls and blocking ban?
- How will PBOC's CIPS expansion affect dollar dominance in cross-border trade?
- Is China's Global South push gaining traction in shifting the balance of power versus the U.S.-led order?

## Evidence

1. [商务部公告2026年第23号 公布将10家美国实体列入出口管制管控名单的决定](https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zc/art/2026/art_600b218f9c6e4326a9a33500eda5d7fb.html) — MOFCOM; published date unknown.
2. [Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 21 of 2026: Blocking ban on US...](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/art/2026/art_78dd015b3fb94aa0b25d5ac98994aa4f.html) — MOFCOM; published date unknown.
3. [PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng meets with central bank governors of relevant...](http://www.pbc.gov.cn/hanglingdao/128697/128734/128874/2026061022502150686/index.html) — PBOC; published date unknown.
4. [PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng meets with Banque de France Governor François...](http://www.pbc.gov.cn/hanglingdao/128697/128734/128874/2026052521380718669/index.html) — PBOC; published date unknown.
5. [Liao Min and Brazilian Deputy Finance Minister Alencastro co-chair...](http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/tupianxinwen1/202606/t20260609_3991372.htm) — MOF; published date unknown.
6. [Chang Junhong attends 11th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the...](http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/tupianxinwen1/202605/t20260515_3989950.htm) — MOF; published date unknown.
7. [CIPS Chairman Wang Hongbo meets with Arief Hossain Khan, Executive Director...](https://www.cips.com.cn/cips/2026-06/10/article_2026061018243226117.html) — CIPS; published date unknown.
8. [跨境清算公司董事长汪洪波会见曼底利银行运营总监蒂莫西](https://www.cips.com.cn/cips/2026-06/17/article_2026061709181072670.html) — CIPS; published date unknown.
9. [2026年6月24日外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202606/t20260624_11951514.shtml) — MFA (spokesperson); published 2026-06-24.
10. [2026年6月23日外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202606/t20260623_11950728.shtml) — MFA (spokesperson); published 2026-06-23.
11. [国务院台办新闻发布会辑录（2026-06-24）](https://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202606/t20260624_12772496.htm) — Taiwan Affairs Office; published 2026-06-24.
12. [外交部副部长苗得雨出席喀麦隆国庆招待会（2026-06-23）](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbxw_new/202606/t20260623_11950257.shtml) — MFA (news); published 2026-06-23.
13. [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun Holds Regular Press Conference on...](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202606/t20260625_11952304.shtml) — MFA (spokesperson); published 2026-06-25.

Revision dates describe China Snapshot readings, not policy effective dates. Citation overlap is not causation or a measure of importance.