Trade & Exports

China's external surplus remains near record levels and its two-track trade strategy—deepening non-US market ties while hedging the US truce—is being reinforced, not revised, by the latest data and policy moves. SAFE data for July 2026 show goods and services exports of $424.2bn, imports of $333.0bn, and a surplus of $91.2bn, with the goods balance alone at $110.3bn and services still in deficit at $19.1bn ¹. Goods exports remain the entire engine of the external surplus.

The composition of that engine explains the policy push toward ASEAN, Central Asia and the 'Global South.' MOFCOM reports China remains Kyrgyzstan's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade of $11.7bn in January–July 2026 driven by electric vehicles, lithium batteries, photovoltaics and mechanical-electrical goods ². The same 'new three' products that trigger overcapacity complaints in Western markets are being redirected east and south. Jiangsu has been particularly active: at the Central Asia Import-Export Expo in Almaty (August 2026), Jiangsu firms signed $150mn in intended deals in three days, up 25% year-on-year, with 7,000+ visitors (up 40%); at the Africa (Kenya) Power, Energy and Water Expo, 20 Jiangsu green equipment companies attracted $30mn in intended cooperation ³. Subnational matchmaking is reinforcing this: Shandong and Vietnam's Bac Ninh province held an enterprise conference focused on electronics, semiconductors, logistics and agricultural processing ⁴.

On the US track, the détente is real but shallow. SCMP reports Chinese business leaders may join Xi Jinping's US trip and the one-year Busan truce extension is 'almost certain'; Wang Yi's meeting with US ambassador David Perdue was about implementing leaders' consensus ⁵. Yet the US trade-remedy machine continues: on Aug 31 the Federal Register posted final affirmative AD and CVD determinations on van-type trailers and subassemblies from China ^6,7, following Aug 28 no-shipment findings on hardwood plywood, a court-related amendment to carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings, and postponement of preliminary PTMEG determinations ^8,9,10. Tariff policy remains erratic, so Beijing cannot treat the truce as durable.

The multilateral and provincial tracks are offsetting this. The Third APEC Senior Officials' Meeting in Dalian produced consensus on practical cooperation in anti-corruption, oceans and fisheries, food security, health and energy, and chair Chen Xu said preparations for the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen in November are entering a new and important stage ¹¹. Gansu's Provincial Party Committee held a special study session on deep integration into BRI construction and building an 'open strong province' ¹². Hainan is operationalising its free trade port: a press conference in Changchun on August 29 disclosed that since island-wide customs closure, zero-tariff items have expanded from 21% to 74% of tariff lines, covering 6,600+ product types; the processing value-added domestic-sales exemption has been optimized; and the forbidden/restricted list has been implemented ¹³. Hainan also held a high-tech industry matchmaking event in Shanghai targeting biomedicine and digital economy, linking the port to Yangtze River Delta innovation resources ¹⁴, and a 'Grand Lecture' on building a more open talent mechanism ¹⁵.

The limit is that the surplus itself fuels the backlash. The more China's goods exports grow, the more anti-dumping and countervailing actions accumulate across multiple markets, not only the US. The new van-trailer final determinations are a reminder that trade remedies targeting China remain a permanent feature; whether new markets can absorb redirected volumes is the key uncertainty. On the domestic side, Jiangsu's expansion of local trade-in subsidies to include embodied-intelligence robots, digital cameras and drones is primarily a consumption stimulus, but it could support import demand for high-end components ¹⁶ — a secondary effect, not an export-game changer.

Outlook: expect continued high export volumes and a large surplus, with the US truce extended but shallow, and a growing emphasis on APEC, BRI and free trade ports. The risks are a slow accretion of barriers and insufficient absorptive capacity in alternative markets, not a near-term collapse in exports. The concrete numbers from Almaty and Nairobi suggest the diversification track is delivering, but the absolute volumes still fall short of replacing the US market.