Trade & Exports

The center of gravity of the global trade fight remains Washington-Beijing, and the decisive variable is still whether the reported 7.5% US 'overcapacity' tariff becomes real before the Xi-Trump meeting ¹. That rate is modest, but it would turn a political slogan into a legal basis for escalating pressure on precisely the sectors — computing hardware, robots, batteries — driving China's export boom. Beijing's answer is on display in the same data flow: diversification is no longer just a customs statistic but an institutional strategy, with Xiong'an's foreign trade surging 6.2-fold in the first half and new land corridors reaching Moscow and ASEAN ².

Washington is tightening every track at once. The Federal Register action on Entity List revisions and the new secondary cylindrical battery investigation ^3,4 shows export controls and anti-dumping probes running in parallel with the possible broad overcapacity tariff. Taiwan's indictment of nine people, including Nvidia and Super Micro employees, for illegally exporting AI servers to China ⁵ shows enforcement is no longer confined to US borders. Chinese media hailing Canada's retaliation as 'Chinese-style' ⁶ cuts both ways: it signals Beijing's playbook is being emulated, but also that Washington's tariff pressure is pushing US allies to adopt defensive measures of their own.

The numbers show why Beijing can absorb the pressure. Xiong'an New Area's H1 trade hit ¥46.24bn, up 6.2x, with the comprehensive bonded zone accounting for ¥24.25bn; a zone-port linkage model gets exports from declaration to ship in under four hours, and the first TIR road route to Moscow cuts shipping time by 40% and cost by 30% ². Jiangsu's ASEAN trade was up 36.4% in Jan–Jul with 3,979 China-ASEAN FTA certificates ⁷, and Hebei's Belt-and-Road share reached 65.1% of provincial trade with Africa up 85.1% ⁸. Heilongjiang is upgrading from transit to local processing, saving ¥1m in guarantees through AEO 'dispatch-and-collect' ⁹.

The institutional layer is thickening. Hainan's meeting with the Third ASEAN Parliamentarian Seminar delegation ¹⁰ and the Henan-Taiwan intelligent-equipment symposium ¹¹ show trade being embedded in political relationships. Macao's Investment Promotion Bureau roadshows in Shenzhen and Guangzhou drew nearly 300 firms and 150+ business matches, pushing Greater Bay Area companies into Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking markets ¹². This is the soft diversification that reduces dependence on any single Western market while creating new channels for capital and services as well as goods.

The leading edge of the export machine remains the 'new new three'. H1 customs data show computing-hardware trade at ¥5.13tn, up 56.6%; surgical-robot exports tripled and industrial-robot exports rose 18.6%; innovative-drug out-licensing already reached 80% of the 2025 full-year total ¹³. These are precisely the goods a 7.5% overcapacity tariff or a battery anti-dumping duty would target, which is why the US is moving on them first.

The limits are real. 7.5% is a report, not a published rule, and talks could produce delay or carving out, as the U.S.-Canada truce collapse showed ¹⁴. The rate is also low relative to 50-100% tariffs already on strategic goods, so the marginal impact would be modest unless it becomes a new baseline for escalation. China's trade strategy looks stronger than ever on paper, but the US is adapting by targeting the sectors where China's competitiveness is sharpest. If the 7.5% tariff becomes real, expect an accelerated pivot to ASEAN, the Belt and Road, and Portuguese/Spanish-speaking markets — and a firm refusal to negotiate on retaliation.